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1 Introduction
A large literature in economics has emphasized the importance of institutions in determining
economic outcomes (e.g. North and Thomas, 1973; North, 1981; Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson, 2001) and shown that political institutions may partly account for the differences
in economic performance seen across countries (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Besley and
Kudamatsu, 2008). Surprisingly, this literature has largely neglected the role of the military. This
omission is problematic: not only is the military central in bringing about institutional change,
but its degree of involvement in the policy-setting process is one of the key dimensions along
which political institutions differ across countries. Without an understanding of what determines
the military's political involvement, it is difcult to develop a clear picture of how institutions
affect economic outcomes.
In this paper we present one of the rst formal models of the military and use it to address
two questions: what determines the military's role in (non-military) policy-making? When does
the military assume a direct role by taking control of the government, and when does it have
an indirect role by inuencing policy without governing directly? We suggest that both roles
have costs and benets that depend on a number of factors; we emphasize one that is of special
relevance in the case of the military: the probability of war.1 We characterize the patterns
of military involvement across countries as a function of the conict environment, derive the
empirical prediction that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the likelihood of wars
and coups, and show empirical evidence that supports this prediction.
Our model considers a dynamic environment where two players, a general (representing the
military) and a politician (representing the government) derive utility from the wars won by the
country and their own involvement in policy. In every period the general can focus on defense
or policy, capturing the trade-off between preparing for war and non-military policy-making.2
1Social scientists have long emphasized the importance of war in determining social, political and economic
institutions. For example, Howard (1976) explains that feudalism arose out of the need to nance the cost of knights'
armour and horses. More recently, Tilly (1990) and Besley and Persson (2008a,bc, 2009) have argued that war
created the conditions necessary for the development of state capacity in Western Europe.
2This trade-off is frequently discussed in the literature; for example, see Nunn (1976, p.186) and Huntington
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Most of our analysis focuses on civilian regimes where a politician is in ofce.3 The politician
must decide whether to task the general with defense, in which case wars may be won but the
general can stage coups; or with policy, in which case wars are lost but coups are avoided. If
tasked with defense, the general must decide whether to stage a coup. Naturally, the optimal
choices will depend on the parameters of the model, and in particular on the likelihood of war.
In equilibrium, a high likelihood of war makes indirect involvement less likely. The reason
is that involvement in policy causes the general to lose wars, and this is more costly when war
is likely. So the likelihood of war reduces the relative value the general assigns to policy. In
addition, war also increases the cost to the politician of tasking the general with policy, and so
she is less likely to do so. Both of these effects operate in the same direction, making indirect
control less likely. The effect war has on the general's decision to stage coups and try to establish
direct control over policy is more complex. In addition to the forces just outlined, war induces
the politician to make the military stronger, and this makes it is easier for the general to stage a
successful coup.4 So although direct control is less attractive to the general when war is likely
(because he would rather focus on defense), it is less costly to establish.
Combining these forces, the model predicts a non-monotonic relationship between the likeli-
hood of war and coups in civilian regimes, with coups least likely when war is unlikely (because
the politician tasks the general with policy and coups cannot succeed) and very likely (because
the politician tasks the general with defense but the general does not want to stage coups). To
understand the underlying logic, suppose that war is unlikely. The general will want to focus on
policy; if made to focus on defense, he will stage a coup so that he can change his focus in the
future. To avoid the coup, the politician tasks the general with policy. The cost of doing this,
namely reducing the general's ability to ght wars, is small because wars are infrequent. On the
other hand, when war is very likely the general does not wish to stage coups; gaining control
over policy is costly because it involves undermining his ability to ght wars. Coups are unlikely
(1957, p.70-72). We discuss this in more detail when we present the model.
3More specically, we focus on regimes where the incumbent is not a military ofcer. The data analyzed in
Section 6 shows that the vast majority of governments, including most autocracies, are led by civilians.
4This is because a military tasked with defense will be prepared for all types of military action, including coups.
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as a result, even when the military is focused on defense and coups are likely to succeed. Coups
are most likely at intermediate likelihoods of war, when it is possible for the general to want to
stage coups, but for the politician to nd it too costly to have him focus on policy.
These results allow us to rationalize the patterns of military political involvement across
countries as a function of the conict environment, and in the process reconcile two conicting
views on this issue. The rst is known as the garrison state view and suggests that war leads
to a politically involved military; the second, the institutional view, asserts that war reduces
the military's involvement in politics and causes it to become focused on defense.5 Our result
that war reduces indirect control over policy is consistent with the institutional view. When we
instead look at the military's attempts to establish direct control, the institutional view holds only
when war is frequent. For low levels of conict an increase in the frequency of war results in
more coups and the possibility of a transition to a military regime, which is consistent with the
garrison state view.
Our results are robust to allowing war to be endogenous: a country can be attacked or it can
choose to attack its neighbor. We nd that a country with a military focused on defense is more
likely to use its strength to start a war in times of peace. In addition, an increase in the threat
environment faced by the country (in the form of a higher probability of being attacked) makes it
more likely that the country will have a strong military, which then makes it more likely that the
country will use it in times of peace, giving rise to a spiral of conict. These results are related to
some of the ndings in the strategic arms buildup literature (see Chassang and Padro-i-Miquel,
2008; Jackson and Morelli, 2008).
Our model represents an alternative to the formulation in Feaver (2003), who models the
U.S. military as an agent of the government and examines when the military shirks and disobeys
the executive's orders. Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2009) follow a similar approach with a
model where the military can act as an agent of the elite; they use the model to provide micro-
5The garrison state view is associated with Harold Laswell (1937, 1941), who was concerned with the increasing
militarization of society in Japan and Germany before the Second World War; the second view is due to Stanislav
Andreski (1968, 1980) and has been used to explain civilian control of the U.S. and Soviet militaries during the Cold
War (Desch, 1999).
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foundations for the role played by the military in the literature on political transitions (Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2001, 2005).6 Their model also predicts when the military will disobey the elite,
overthrow it, and establish a military dictatorship. Our model differs in that it is focused on
the military's role in policy-making, rather than on transitions. Our military is an independent
political player with preferences over policy, and we analyze when and how those preferences are
reected in the policy implementation process. Finally, we emphasize the importance of conict
and the military's defense role, which allows us to derive and test an empirical prediction.7
In the second part of the paper we test the model's prediction of a non-monotonic relation-
ship between the likelihood of war and coups in civilian regimes. We use two specications
that capture this non-monotonicity in a simple way: one where the probability of a coup is a
quadratic function of the likelihood of war, and one where the coefcient on the war variable is
allowed to vary with the value of that variable. We proxy for the likelihood of war in a country
with the fraction of years between 1965 and 1999 in which the country was at war, and simi-
larly for coups. We use annual data on wars from the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conict dataset,
version 4 (Gleditsch et al. 2002, PRIO 2006), while the annual data on coups comes primarily
from Belkin-Schofer (2003). We nd the predicted non-monotonic relationship to be present
in both specications. As a check we compute the war and coup frequencies over ve year
intervals, which allows us to exploit the time dimension of our data and introduce country and
time xed effects. The results of this panel analysis are similar to those of the cross-country
regressions. Overall, the empirical results provide strong evidence that the relationship between
the likelihood of war and coups is indeed non-monotonic.
Our contribution to the empirical literature on the causes of coups lies in being the rst to
establish a relationship between the likelihood of war and coups. An important related paper
is Londregan and Poole (1990), who nd that income per capita, economic growth and the
6Leon (2007) considers a similar relationship between a government and its military, but from an empirical
perspective. Related studies of the military, but focused on different issues, include Finer (1962), Nordlinger (1977)
and Leon (2006).
7Besley and Robinson (2007) consider a military with preferences over policy. Unlike them, we emphasize the
military's role in ghting wars, how this determines its ability to stage coups, and how the conict environment
affects the military's role in policy.
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incidence of coups in the recent past are important determinants of coups d'etat. More recently,
Collier and Hoefer (2007) argue that African militaries run protection rackets in which funding
is extracted in exchange for not staging coups, and nd evidence in support of this argument.
Leon (2007) shows evidence consistent with the proposition that a country is most likely to face
a coup when its military spending is at historically low levels.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we describe our model of the military,
while in Section 3 we derive and discuss the equilibria. In Section 4 we consider the role of war,
while in Section 5 we allow war to be endogenous. In Section 6 we present empirical evidence
that supports the model's main testable prediction. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Model of the Military
We consider an innitely repeated game between two players, a politician (who represents all
civilians) and a general (who heads the military). There are two political regimes, rt 2 fP;Gg,
which differ in the identity of the incumbent: in a civilian regime P the politician is the incum-
bent, while in a military regime G the general is the incumbent. In each period the incumbent
decides whether the military is focused on defense ( t = 1) or (non-military) policy ( t = 0),
where policy refers to all non-military activities in which the general may be involved, from
running immigration and security at airports to building roads, distributing food and running
banks. The trade-off between military and non-military activities is frequently discussed in the
literature; Nunn (1976), for example, observes that "[n]othing is worse for military professional
development than political involvement" (p.186). Huntington (1957) makes a similar argument
and states that "specialized competence acquired by professional training and experience is nec-
essary for decision and action" (p.71), and that such competence is negatively affected by in-
volvement in politics (p.70-72).
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2.1 Wars and Coups
In period t the nation faces a war with probability , where !t = 1 if there is a war and !t = 0
otherwise.8 This could be any type of war, including international and civil wars, in which the
politician and the general are on the same side. The probability that a war is won is given by
f( t) =
8><>:  if  t = 10 if  t = 0
9>=>; (1)
where  measures military capability. This capability is useful for ghting wars only if the
military is tasked with defense. Winning a war generates an ego-rent of E for both the politician
and the general; we assume that a lost war results in a payoff of 0.9
In a civilian regime, after uncertainty about the war is resolved, the general can stage a coup;
let ct = 1 if he stages a coup and ct = 0 otherwise. When  t = 1 a coup's probability of
success equals , where  captures exogenous factors that impact on how military capability 
translates into a coup's probability of success. If  is small, coups rarely succeed, even when the
military has high capability ; if  is large, coups succeed often, even if capability  is low. We
assume that   1, and write a coup's probability of success as follows:
f c( t) = f( t);
which captures the fact that military capability can be used to ght wars but also to stage suc-
cessful coups. A military that is well prepared for war should be able to stage coups with ease: it
can take the strength that was developed to ght an enemy and use it against its own government.
If the coup fails the civilian regime continues; the general is sacked and receives 0 forever
after, and a new general takes his place. A successful coup, on the other hand, results in a move
to a military regime; the politician is removed, the general becomes the next period incumbent,
8In Section 5 we allow the probability of war to be endogenous.
9Assuming that there is a costD to losing a war does not affect our qualitative results.
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and a new general and a new politician take their places.10 For simplicity, we assume that the
politician cannot stage a coup to remove a general, so that military regimes are absorbing.
2.2 Actions and Payoffs
In a civilian regime the politician decides the military's focus; in a military regime she makes no
decision. She seeks to maximize the discounted sum of her instantaneous utility
1X
j=0
jupt+j(!t+j ; rt+j)
where  < 1 and the instantaneous utilities are given by
upt (!t = 1; rt) = f( t (rt))E + 
upt (!t = 0; rt) = 
when she is in ofce; she receives a per period payoff of 0 when out of ofce. Here f( t (rt))E
is the expected value of ghting a war, while  is a payoff for every period she is in ofce. We
interpret this as an ego-rent derived from policy-making. Notice that a smaller value of  implies
that a relatively greater weight is placed on war. Finally, coups only affect the politician's future
payoffs, and do so by impacting on the identity of the future incumbent.
In a civilian regime the general must decide whether to stage a coup; in a military regime,
he needs to decide the military's task. We dene the general's payoff as follows:
1X
j=0
jugt+j(!t+j ; rt+j):
10We can think that there is an innite pool of identical soldiers from which new generals are randomly drawn,
and an innite pool of identical civilians from which new politicians are randomly chosen.
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The instantaneous utilities are given by
ugt (! = 1; rt) = f( t (rt))P + (1   t (rt)) 
ugt (! = 0; rt) = (1   t (rt)) 
when he is in ofce as either head of the military or as the incumbent, and he receives a payoff
of 0 when out of ofce. Here  is the ego-rent the general receives when the military is tasked
with policy. Coups only affect the general's future instantaneous payoffs by impacting on the
identity of the future incumbent. He receives a per period payoff of 0 when out of ofce.
Notice that the expected value of ghting wars is the same for the politician and the general,
so that war produces a common benet. Policy-making, on the other hand, generates only a
private benet given by  or .11 We assume that ;  < E; this has the implication that when
war is certain ( = 1) and it is won with probability one ( = 1), then both the politician and
the general place a greater weight on defense than on policy.
2.3 Timing
The period t game proceeds as follows:
1. The incumbent is determined: if there was a successful coup in period t   1, the general
becomes the period t incumbent; otherwise the period t  1 incumbent remains in ofce.
2. The incumbent sets  t 2 f0; 1g and policy-making takes place.
3. Nature determines whether there is a war !t 2 f0; 1g; it is won with probability f( t).
4. The general decides whether to stage a coup ct ( t; !t) 2 f0; 1g; it succeeds with proba-
bility f c( t).
11This is somewhat stark, but all we need is for policy-making to have a greater private benet component than
winning wars. Since defense is often taken to be one of the best examples of a public good, this is a reasonable
assumption.
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2.4 Equilibrium Concept
We focus on the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria of this game, which requires that strate-
gies at time t be conditional on the state variables and on any actions taken earlier in that period.
In addition, we assume stationarity, so that the value functions do not depend on time directly.
In this game the state variables are the regime rt 2 fP;Gg and whether there is a war !t.
The strategies are given by Sp(rt; !t) for the politician and Sg(rt; !t) for the general, and they
determine the value of the choice variables  t and ct. A pure strategyMarkov perfect equilibrium
of this game is a pair of strategies Sp(rt; !t) and Sg(rt; !t) such that they are best responses to
each other for all rt (i.e. in all states of the world).
3 Equilibria
3.1 Value Functions
Let V p (P ) and V p (G) denote the politician's value functions, while V g (P ) and V g (G) are the
value functions for the general. Since we are assuming stationarity, the functions themselves are
not indexed by time. In addition, because of the Markov assumption, they will only be functions
of the regime type, whether there is a war, and all actions previously taken in that period. The
politician's value function in a civilian regime can be written recursively:
V p (P ) = max
2f0;1g
8><>:  [f()E +  +  (1  ct ( t; !t = 1) f
c())V p0 (P )]+
(1  ) [ +  (1  ct ( t; !t = 0) f c())V p0 (P )]
9>=>; (2)
where V p0 (P ) indicates the next period's value function.12 The rst line in (2) equals the proba-
bility of war  times the expected value in that state of the world. This expected value equals the
expected value of the war, plus the expected continuation value. The continuation value equals
that of a civilian regime if there is not a successful coup in the current period, and 0 otherwise.
12For simplicity we have not made explicit the dependence on the political regime. Notice that the regime impacts
on these utilities only through its effect on the choice variables.
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The second line equals the probability that there is no war times the expected payoff in that state
of the world, which equals the value of policy, plus the expected continuation value. Notice
that although current payoffs depend entirely on the politician's decision, the future depends on
whether the general stages a coup. This decision, in turn, can be affected by the politician's
decision.
In the case of a military regime,
V p (G) = 

f()E +  + V p0 (G)

+ (1  )  + V p0 (G)
= f()E +  + V p0 (G) : (3)
The politician makes no choices in this case, and there are no coups by assumption.
Similar logic yields the following value function for the general under civilian rule:
V g (P ) = f()E+(1  ) + max
c2f0;1g

(1  ct ( t; !t))V g0 (P ) + ct ( t; !t) f c()V g0 (G)

:
(4)
In this case the general's decision is whether to stage a coup. The rst term is the expected
instantaneous payoff from war, and the second is the expected instantaneous payoff from policy.
The last term is the continuation value: it equals  times the value of a civilian regime if no coup
takes place; if there is a coup, it equals  times the probability that the coup succeeds times the
value of a military regime. Notice that the decision to stage a coup only affects the expected
future payoffs. These are a function of the military's task  , and this is how the politician's
choice can have an impact on whether coups take place.
If in a military regime,
V g (G) = max
2f0;1g

f()E + (1  )  + V g0 (G)	 ;
where the regime is an absorbing state and there are no coups.
To solve for the equilibria we use the one-stage-deviation principle, as stated in Theorem 4.2
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in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p.110). This theorem says that a strategy is subgame perfect if
no player can gain from deviating in only one time period and after one specic history. For this
theorem to hold it is necessary for the game to be continuous at innity; this is true in games
which, like this one, have overall payoffs that are a discounted sum of uniformly bound period
payoffs. The main useful implication of this theorem is that we can take the future values of the
choice variable as given. As Fudenberg and Tirole note, this is simply the principle of optimality
of dynamic programming.
3.2 Military Regime
In this political regime the politician makes no decision and the general solves the following:
V g (G) = max
2f0;1g

f()E + (1  )  + V g0 (G)	 :
Using the one-stage deviation principle in the current period, the general must choose between
setting  = 0 and receiving  in the current period, and setting  = 1 and receiving E in the
current period. The expected payoffs generated by these choices are:
V g (b (G) = 0;G) =  + V g0 (G) (5)
V g (b (G) = 1;G) = E + V g0 (G)
Lemma 1 (Military Regime) If (i)   E, the general chooses b (G) = 0 and his value is
V g (G) = 1  . If (ii)  < E, he chooses b (G) = 1 and his value is V g (G) = E1  :
Proof. See the Appendix.
This lemma shows that in a military regime the general's decision will depend on the value
he places on policy. Case (i) shows that a general who places a large relative weight on policy
will task the military with policy. If, as in case (ii), the general places a large relative weight on
winning wars (because he does not care much for policy or because he is likely to win, war is
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likely, or winning wars produces a high payoff), he will task the military with defense. Since
by assumption the general does not face the threat of a coup, his decisions are not affected by
strategic considerations.
3.3 Civilian Regime
Suppose the politician is in ofce. A general will not stage a coup to try to overthrow her if the
expected payoff from doing so is less than the expected payoff from staying in a civilian regime,
f c()V g0(G)  V g0(P ): (6)
This condition follows from (4) and involves the next period's value functions. The right
hand side shows the expected value of doing nothing: in the next period the regime continues to
be civilian. On the left hand side, the coup succeeds with probability f c(), in which case the
general becomes the incumbent in the next period and the regime switches to a military one. If
a coup is staged and fails the general is removed at the end of the period.
Now suppose that in equilibrium coups do not take place in the current period if the regime
is P , then from stationarity and the Markov assumption they also do not happen in the future if
the regime is P . This implies that V g0(P ) = V g00(P ), and
V g0(P ) = f()E + (1  ) + V g0(P )
=
f()E + (1  )
1   :
Then the constraint (6) becomes
f c()V g0(G)  f()E + (1  )
1   (7)
where the left hand side is the expected value of staging a coup, while the right hand side is the
expected value when no coup is staged.
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If  < P , we can rewrite the above as
f c()

E
1  

 f()

E
1  

+
(1  )
1   
where we have made use of the results from the previous section. Notice that this expression
always holds when  = 1. If   P , the expression becomes
f c()


1  

 f()

P
1  

+
(1  )
1    (8)
and coups are avoided for  = 1 when
  E

 : (9)
A small  makes coups relatively unappealing, even if they are likely to succeed. This expression
is increasing in the probability of war : when war is likely, greater relative weight is placed
on being prepared for it. Coups, which are aimed at tasking the general with policy, become
relatively less appealing and will take place for a smaller range of parameter values.
To summarize:
Lemma 2 If  > , coups happen when  = 1.
This lemma establishes that a military tasked with defense will stage a coup when the general
places a sufciently high weight on policy. When this is the case, the politician will have to take
the possibility of a coup into account when deciding the military's task.
When the general places a low value on political control (  ), coups do not take place
even if  = 1. Recall that we can write
V p(b = 1;P ) = max
2f0;1g

f()E +  + V p0(P )
	
Using the one-stage-deviation principle, it follows that  is chosen to maximize f()E + ,
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and so the politician clearly chooses b (P ) = 1. In short, it is optimal for the military to be
tasked with defense and there are no coups in this case.
When the general values political control ( > ), coups will happen if  = 1. The politi-
cian's value function in this case is (from (2)):
V p (b = 1;P ) = E +  +  (1  )V p0 (D) : (10)
The rst two terms are the period 1 payoff, while the third is the expected continuation value.
Using stationarity and the Markov assumption, it follows that
V p (b = 1;P ) = E + 
1   (1  ) :
If the politician sets  = 0 instead, there are no coups and
V p (b = 0;P ) =  + V p0 (P )
Using stationarity and the Markov assumption, it follows that
V p (b = 0;P ) = 
1   :
This helps show the decision faced by the politician: a value of b = 1 implies a positive
probability of winning wars, but it also has a negative impact on her likelihood of being in ofce
in the next period. This is because it triggers a coup by increasing its probability of success. A
simple comparison establishes that b = 0 when
 >
[1  ]

E  
and b = 1 otherwise. In short, when the politician places a high value  on policy, she will task
the general with policy to avoid coups and stay in power. When she values war, however, she
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will prefer to have the general tasked with defense, even if it results in her being removed from
ofce. In this case the cost of avoiding coups, in the form of a reduced ability to ght wars, is
too high.
We summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Civilian Regime) Dene   [1 ] E and   E . (i) If    the politician
chooses b (P ) = 1 and the general does not stage a coup (bc = 0). (ii) If  >  and    the
politician sets b (P ) = 1 and the general stages a coup (bc = 1). (iii) If  >  and  >  the
politician sets b (P ) = 0 and the general does not stage a coup (bc = 0).
Part (i) of the proposition shows that when the general places a large relative value on win-
ning wars ( small), the politician will task him with defense and he will not stage coups. Parts
(ii) and (iii) show what happens when the general instead places a low relative value on winning
wars ( high). In this case the general will stage a coup if he is tasked with defense. The politi-
cian must decide whether to task him with defense and face a coup or task him with policy and
avoid the coup, at the cost of being unable to ght wars. She chooses the rst option when war
is relatively valuable ( is low): she will be willing to face a coup in order to be prepared for
war. She chooses the second option when war has a low relative value ( is high). In this case
she tasks the general with policy, making the military unable to ght wars or stage coups.
Proposition 1 allows us to classify civilian regimes according to the general's focus and
whether he stages coups. A general who places a high value on war never stages coups, regard-
less of the task assigned; we refer to this as a No Control regime and it corresponds to region
A in Figure 1. This case is consistent with what we observe in countries in North America and
Western Europe, where the military is focused on defense, plays largely no role in politics, and
stages no coups.
In region B of Figure 1 the general places a high relative weight on policy, while the politi-
cian places a relatively high value on war. The general stages coups, and we refer to these as
Direct Control regimes. Here the politician is unwilling to make the concessions necessary to
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Figure 1: Military Focus and Coups
avoid coups. As a result, the general stages a coup in an attempt to establish direct control over
policy. Chile's government under Allende is an example of such a regime: Allende needed a
strong military in case of attack by both internal and foreign enemies.13
In region C the general is tasked with policy; this happens because both the general and the
politician give a low value to war, and the politician can prevent coups by tasking the general
with policy. We refer to this as an Indirect Control regime, and the majority of current Latin
American democracies fall into this category.
In the next section we discuss the comparative statics with respect to the probability of war
, but we rst establish two straightforward results:
Proposition 2 (Comparative Statics) (i) An increase in  causes both  and  to decrease. (ii)
An increase in E causes both  and  to increase.
13Allende used the military in several instances to repress political opponents. Furthermore, Chile views a strong
military as necessary because of the military threat posed by Bolivia and Peru (Nunn, 1976).
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Greater  results in a higher probability of success for coups, so that the general is more
likely to stage them and the cutoff value  decreases. It also makes the politician more interested
in avoiding coups (since they are more likely to succeed), resulting in a decrease in the cutoff
value . An increase in E makes being prepared for war more desirable to both the general, who
is less interested in coups, and the politician, who is less interested in tasking the general with
policy. As a result, both  and  increase.
4 War
The likelihood of war plays a central role in our model. An increase in the probability of war 
makes war relatively more appealing for the general than policy, so that  increases. Likewise,
it makes it more costly for the politician to try to avoid coups by tasking the general with policy,
so  also increases. In order to determine how these changes affect the likelihood of having a
general focused on policy and the probability of a coup, we must determine how the changes
in  and  affect the parameter ranges for which the three types of civilian regimes arise in
equilibrium. We begin with the following denition.
Denition Let b; b  E be two values such that   b and   b. (i) The parameter range
over which a No Control regime exists is dened as the area b. (ii) The parameter range
over which a Direct Control regime exists is dened as the area (b   ) (b   ). (iii)
The parameter range over which an Indirect Control regime exists is dened as the area
(b   ). These corresponds to areas (A), (B) and (C) in Figure 1.
We can now establish the following:
Proposition 3 (War) An increase in the likelihood of war : (i) increases the parameter range
for which a country can have a military focused on defense that does not stage coups (region (A)),
(ii) decreases the parameter range for which the military is tasked with policy to avoid coups
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(region (C)), (iii) has a non-monotonic effect on the parameter range for which the military is
focused on defense and stages coups (region (B)).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The rst part of this proposition establishes that wars increase the parameter range for which
the military will be tasked with defense but it will not stage coups. The reason is that wars make
coups relatively less appealing for the general. The second part of the proposition is intuitive:
since an increase in the frequency of war reduces the relative value the general gives to policy, he
is less likely to stage a coup. War also increases the cost to the politician of having the military
focus on policy. Both effects operate in the same direction, and as a result war reduces the range
of parameters for which the military is tasked with policy.
The third and most interesting part of the proposition establishes how the likelihood of coups
changes with the probability of war. It shows that there is a non-monotonic relationship between
the frequency of wars and coups, with coups being least frequent for low and high probabilities
of war. This result depends on how the effect of war on the actions of the politician interacts
with the effect war has on the general's actions. When war is unlikely, the general will want to
stage coups. To avoid them, the politician will task him with policy. The cost of doing this is
that it undermines the general's ability to ght wars; this cost is low because wars are infrequent.
The result is that coups are unlikely. When war is frequent, the general does not wish to stage
coups; focusing on policy is costly because it involves undermining his ability to ght wars. As
a result, coups are unlikely, even when the politician tasks the general with defense. Coups are
more likely at intermediate frequencies of war, when it is possible for the general to want to
stage coups, but for the politician to nd it too costly to have him focus on policy.
Proposition 3 allows us to reconcile two conicting views of the impact of war on the mil-
itary's role in politics. The rst is associated with Harold Laswell (1937, 1941) and is known
as the "garrison state" view. It suggests that war leads to a politically involved military, and is
based on the observation that conict increased the militarization of society in Japan and Ger-
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many in the 1930s and 1940s. The "institutional" view, often credited to Stanislav Andreski
(1968, 1980), asserts that war causes the military to become focused on defense and reduces
its involvement in politics. It is more recent and was developed to explain the success of the
U.S. and the Soviet Union in keeping their militaries under civilian control. Our result that war
decreases the general's control over policy is consistent with the institutional view. If instead we
look at coups, the institutional view holds only when war is frequent. For low levels of conict,
however, our results are consistent with the garrison state view: an increase in the frequency of
war results in more coups and the possibility of a transition to a military regime.
These results reect an effect of war that is captured in the instantaneous utility functions:
it increases congruence between the politician and the general. When war is likely, the common
term (the expected value of war) is high, in which case both the politician and the general are
likely to agree that  = 1 is optimal. In this case there will be no coups, since there is no dis-
agreement over the choice variable. When war is unlikely, a conict of interest arises between
the politician and the general. The idea that war brings about congruence is not new; for exam-
ple, historian Kenneth Morgan writes that "on the eve of the world war, therefore, Britain seemed
to present a classic picture of a civilized liberal democracy on the verge of dissolution, racked by
tensions and strains with which its sanctions and institutions were unable to cope. And yet, as
so often in the past, once the supreme crisis of war erupted, these elements of conict subsided
with remarkable speed. An underlying mood of united purpose gripped the nation" (Morgan,
1984; p.582-583).
5 Endogenous War
So far we have assumed that war is exogenous. In reality, a country may choose to start a war,
and in this section we show that our results are robust to allowing for this. Suppose that when
the country is not attacked, the incumbent can decide to start a war.14 Again, the probability that
14In terms of the timeline in Section 2, this happens between steps 3 and 4.
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a war is won is given by (1). However, we now assume that while a successful war generates a
common ego-rent of E, a lost war generates an ego-cost of D.15 Furthermore, we assume that
 (E +D) D > 0 (11)
so that the expected value of ghting a war is positive.16 Finally, we simplify the algebra by
assuming that if a coup takes place the incumbent is removed from ofce at the start of the next
period regardless of the coup's outcome.17
Let ai = 1 for i 2 fp; gg when an incumbent i decides to start a war, and ai = 0 otherwise.
We can write the new payoff functions for the politician as follows:
V p (P ) = max
2f0;1g;ap2f0;1g
8><>: f() [E +D]  D + (1  ) a
pf() [E +D]  (1  ) apD
+ +  (1  ct)V p0 (P )
9>=>;
V p (G) = f() [E +D]  D + (1  ) agf() [E +D]  (1  ) agD +  + V p0 (G)
where these differ from those in the previous section in two respects. First, wars that are lost
generate a cost of D, so that the expected value of ghting a war is f()E + (1   f())D =
f() [E +D]   D. Second, wars can be started by the incumbent, so that we now have an
extra component (1  ) apf() [E +D]   (1  ) apD = (1  ) ap [f() [E +D] D] if
the incumbent is a politician (and an analogous expression if he is a general).
The new payoff functions for the general are:
V g (P ) = f() [E +D]  D + (1  ) apf() [E +D]  (1  ) apD + (1  ) 
15We now need to assume that losing a war is costly; otherwise wars would happen in every period.
16This can be easily seen by rewriting the condition as E  (1  )D > 0. At the end of the Section we discuss
what happens when this condition does not hold.
17This assumption does not affect the results in any qualitative way.
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+ max
ct2f0;1g
[(1  ct)V g0 (P ) + ctf c()V g0 (G)]
V g (G) = max
2f0;1g;ag2f0;1g
8><>: f() [E +D]  D + (1  ) a
gf() [E +D]  (1  ) agD
+(1  )  + V g0 (G)
9>=>;
In a military regime, the general's decisions are as follows:
Proposition 4 (Endogenous War 1) Suppose the regime is military, and let    [E +D]  
(1  )D. (i) If  < , the general chooses b = 1, bag = 1, and his payoff is given by
V g(G) = [E+D] D1  . (ii) If   , the general chooses b = 0, bag = 0, and his payoff is given
by V g(G) =  D1  . (iii)  is increasing in .
Proof. See the appendix.
This result shows that a general focused on defense will choose to start wars, while if he
focuses on policy he will not. Part (iii) of the proposition shows that the cutoff increases with
the probability of war. This implies that military regimes that are more likely to be attacked are
more likely to prepare for war, which then leads them to attack others; this gives rise to a "spiral
of violence."
In a civilian regime, we can establish the following result:
Proposition 5 (Endogenous War 2) Suppose the regime is civilian, and let  = (E+D) D +
D,  = 1  [ (E +D) D] + D . Then (i) if  < , the politician sets b = 1, bap = 1 and
the general does not stage a coup. (ii) If    and  < , the politician sets b = 1, bap = 1 and
the general stages a coup. (iii) If    and   , the politician sets b = e, bap = 0 and the
general does not stage a coup.
Proof. See the appendix.
This result is very similar to that without endogenous wars. The reason is that the choice of
military focus again impacts on whether the politician starts a war, and this generates a "spiral of
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violence." More generally, the countries that are more likely to be attacked are also more likely
to start a war, as the following Proposition shows:
Proposition 6 An increase in the likelihood of war increases the probability that a civilian
regime starts a war in times of peace.
Proof. See the appendix.
Finally, we should note that relaxing assumption (11) causes wars to be costly in expectation,
so that both the politician and the general agree that ai = 0 is always optimal. The problem then
simplies to that discussed in the previous section.
6 Empirical Evidence: Wars and Coups
In this section we show empirical evidence that is consistent with the model's prediction of a
non-monotonic relationship between the likelihood of wars and coups, nding a robust non-
monotonic relationship between these variables.
We begin by estimating the cross-country specication:
coupi = + 1  wari + 2  war2i + 1  controlsi + "i (12)
where coupi andwari measure the fraction of years in which coups or wars took place in country
i, and serve as proxies for the probability of a coup and war. The quadratic term is a simple
way of capturing the non-monotonicity predicted by the model. The controlsi will account for
GDP and population in two ways: rst, by using the World Bank's country income groups as
dummies, and then by using the log of a country's GDP (in millions) and the log of population
(in millions) in the year before it enters the sample (1964 or the year of independence). Finally,
"i is the error term. We also estimate a second specication:
coupi = + 1  wari + 2  I  wari + 1  controlsi + "i (13)
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where I = 1 if wari > 0:5 and 0 otherwise. This is another simple way of capturing the
non-monotonicity predicted by the theoretical model.
One disadvantage of aggregating our data into a cross-country dataset is that the results will
capture country specic time-invariant factors that can impact on both the frequency of wars and
coups, but are difcult to measure or control for (e.g. institutions). One solution is to exploit the
time dimension in the data, which allows us to introduce country xed effects and exploit the
within country variation over time. This requires that we dene our variables differently, but the
specications are quite similar:
coupi;t = + 1  wari;t + 2  war2i;t + 1  controlsi;t (14)
+t + i + "i;t
and
coupi;t = + 1  wari;t + 2  I  wari;t + 1  controlsi;t (15)
+t + i + "i;t
where coupi;t and wari;t now measure the fraction of years in country i and period t in which
coups or wars took place, and controli;t is measured in the year before the period starts. The
periods are dened to be 5 years long: 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94,
1995-99. The t are period xed effects, while the i are country xed effects. The last term is
a country and period specic error.
6.1 The Data
We use the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conict dataset, version 4 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; PRIO, 2006)
to determine the years in which a country was at war. We include all years in which the country
is listed as ghting in a conict, with the exception of those in which both the enemy is listed
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as a "military faction" and the country experienced a coup. This means that we include both
international and civil wars; the reasons for treating both types of war equally is that our model
focuses on the interaction between politicians and generals, and in both cases their interests will
be aligned. For example, it is clear that Colombia's civil war has brought the government and
the military closer together. Our sample period is 1965-1999, which are the years for which the
coup data is available.
The data on coups comes primarily from the dataset compiled by Belkin and Schofer (2003),
with some additional data from A.S. Banks' (2001) cross-national time-series data archive. The
Belkin-Schofer (2003) coup database is the most accurate available. One of its main advantages
is that it includes both successful and failed coups, and thus avoids the sample selection issues
of widely used datasets that report only successful coups. To compile their data, Belkin and
Schofer (2003) combined the list of coups available from a number of academic articles with
that from Keesing's Contemporary Archives. They ensured its accuracy by consulting regional
experts and checking conicting cases with the New York Times and the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. More details can be found in their paper.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the data. Table 1 shows the number of country-years in which
wars were fought and coups took place: of a total of 4,440 country-years, coups took place in
only 203 and wars in 837. Clearly both events are uncommon. Furthermore, since our model's
prediction applies only to non-military regimes, we only consider country-years in which the
head of state is not a military ofcer. To nd these cases we use the variable S21F3 from A.S.
Banks (2001), which codes the identity of the head of state: it takes a value of 1 if the head of
state is a monarch, 2 if it is a president, 3 if it is a military ofcer, and 4 if other (including a
theocratic ruler). We drop all 257 observations coded as a 3, but this has no relevant impact on
the results we present below.18
Table 2 shows the frequency of wars and coups. The rst part focuses on the cross-country
variables, where the frequency of war is measured as the fraction of years in which the country
18We should clarify that our data includes many dictatorship in which the head of state is a civilian and not a
military ofcer.
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was at war, while the frequency of coups refers to the fraction of years in which a coup took
place. As before, wars are more frequent than coups, with some countries being at war in every
year they appear in the sample. The second part of the table shows the frequencies calculated
over 5 year intervals: again wars are more frequent than coups.
The controls for income and population are taken from the World Bank's World Develop-
ment Indicators (2007).
6.2 Results
Table 3 reports the results for the cross-country specications (12) and (13). The rst column
shows a quadratic relationship between wars and coups, as predicted by the model. The maxi-
mum occurs at a frequency of 0.47, so countries that experienced war for about half the years
have the highest likelihood of experiencing coups (although most of the countries are to the left
of the maximum). The second column in Table 2 shows that this relationship remains after we
introduce the World Bank country income dummies, a rough measure of wealth. Finally, the
third column shows the results when we control for GDP and population measured in the year
before the country enters the sample. In all cases the signs are as predicted by the theoretical
model, and the coefcients are signicant. The second part of Table 3 reports the results for
specication (13); in this case the coefcients are about half the size and largely insignicant.
However, the signs remain the same, showing that the non-monotonic relationship also arises in
this case.
As we discussed above, it is possible that there are country specic features that are driving
all of these variables; for example, institutions may affect the frequency of both wars and coups.
To partially address these issues we focus on specications (14) and (15); Table 4 shows the
results. In the rst column we report the results for a pooled regression, where once again
war exhibits a signicant quadratic relationship with coups. In the second column we control
for country and time xed effects, and the results lose some signicance. The coefcients are
similar to those in the cross-country regressions and the signs are as expected. In column 3 we
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control for income and population; the signs on war remain the same, but the standard errors
are larger and signicance largely disappears. Specication (15), on the other hand, shows the
expected pattern of signs and they are signicant. The coefcients are very similar to those in
specication (14).
These tests suggest that there is a consistent non-monotonic relationship between wars and
coups. Although signicance may depend on the specication used, the signs remain the same
across all the specications. The fact that the results do not change in any substantial way
across specications should reassure us that the quadratic relationship between wars and coups
is robust.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a theory of the military's role in policy-making, and consider when it
intervenes in politics and whether its involvement is direct or indirect. We argue that the mili-
tary's role in ghting wars must be taken into account when thinking about this organization's
political actions. We show that both roles have different costs and benets to the military, which
vary with the likelihood of war. War makes indirect involvement less likely, but rst increases
and then decreases the probability of direct involvement. This is because war makes successful
coups easier to stage, but reduces their payoff. This result implies a non-monotonic relation-
ship between the likelihood of war and coups in non-military regimes, and we present empirical
evidence consistent with this prediction.
At the beginning of this paper we argued that it was important to understand the role played
by the military in the policy-making process, and that this likely had an impact on economic
outcomes. In this paper we have addressed the rst point, but said nothing about the second. This
very important question merits its own independent treatment, and so we leave it for future work.
We should note, however, that there is a growing literature that looks at how democracies and
non-democracies differ in their economic policies and outcomes; it includes Gil, Mulligan and
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Sala-i-Martin (2004), who compare the policies chosen by democracies and non-democracies,
and Besley and Kudamatsu (2008), who consider which types of non-democracies choose better
policies. Future work should look in more detail at how policy choices differ depending on the
degree of military involved in politics.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1
Proof. It follows from stationarity and the Markov assumption that if the general chooses  = 0
in the current period, he does so in all future periods; likewise if he sets  = 1. This implies that
V i (r) = V i0 (r), which allows us to solve for V g (G) when b (G) = 0 and when b (G) = 1.
Comparing these two values produces the condition  R P .
Proposition 3
Proof. To prove (i) notice that the range b is increasing in the probability of war . For
part (ii) the relevant range is (b   )(b   ), which becomes smaller with . Finally, the
range for part (iii) is given by (b   ), which has a derivative with respect to  equal to
 E

(1 )
 E +
hb   E i (1 ) E, which equals b (1 ) E > 0 when evaluated at  = 0 and
 2E

(1 )
 E +
b (1 ) E < 0 at  = 1, because b < E.
Proposition 4
Proof. Suppose the general chooses not to start a war so that ag = 0. His payoff is given by
f() [E +D]   D + (1  )  + V g0 (G), and he will choose either  = 1 or  = 0. If
he chooses the former, his payoff is [E+D] D1  ; if he chooses the latter, his payoff is equal to
 D
1  . It then follows that if  <  [E +D] the general chooses (i) a
g = 0,  = 1; and his
payoff is [E+D] D1  ; if    [E +D] he chooses (ii) ag = 0,  = 0; and his payoff is given
by  D1  .
If instead he chooses ag = 1, his payoff becomes f() [E +D] D+(1  ) +V g0 (G),
where again the choice is between  = 0 and  = 1. If he chooses (iii) ag = 1;  = 1, then his
33
payoff is [E+D] D1  , and if he chooses (iv) a
g = 1;  = 0, then it is  D1  . It is straightforward
to see that assumption (11) ensures that the payoff under (iii) is always greater than that under
(i), and that (ii) is always greater than (iv). It follows that the choice is between (ii) and (iii), and
(ii) delivers a greater payoff whenever
   D
1   >
 [E +D] D
1   ;
or equivalently, when
 >  [E +D]  (1  )D  :
This proves parts (i) and (ii). Part (iii) follows from differentiating  with respect to .
Proposition 5
Proof. In a civilian regime, the general will stage a coup if f c()V g0(G)  V g0(P ).
Part A: Suppose that  = 1 and  < .
From the previous proposition V g0(G) = [E+D] D1  . The no coup condition becomes

 [E +D] D
1   
 [E +D]  D + (1  ) ap [E +D]  (1  ) apD
1   .
If ap = 1 the condition becomes  [ [E +D] D]   [E +D]   D; so that it is always
satised, giving the politician a payoff of
 [E +D] D + 
1   :
If ap = 0, the highest payoff is when coups do not take place, in which case the politician
receives
 [E +D]  D + 
1   ,
but this is lower than the payoff from ap = 1. To summarize: when  < , the politician sets
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 = 1 and (11) holds, it is optimal for the politician to set ap = 1 and there are no coups.
Part B: Suppose that  = 1 and   .
Then from the previous proposition V g0(G) =  D1  . If the politician sets a
p = 1, coups
will be avoided if

   D
1   
 (E +D) D
1  
or equivalently,
   (E +D) D

+ D  :
If the politician sets ap = 0, coups are avoided when

   D
1    
 (E +D) D
1  
or equivalently,
   (E +D) D

+ D  e;
where e  . We need to consider three regions. First (i)     e, in which case coups are
avoided regardless of whether ap = 0 or ap = 1. Since the payoff for the rst choice is
 (E +D)  D + 
1  
while for the latter it is
 (E +D) D + 
1  
using assumption (11) it follows that the latter is greater, so the politician will choose ap = 1.
Now suppose that (ii) e <   , where coups are avoided only if ap = 1. If the politician
sets ap = 0, her payoff is
 (E +D)  D + ;
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while her payoff if she sets ap = 1 is
 (E +D) D + 
1  
Again the politician chooses ap = 1 and there are no coups.
Now suppose that (iii)   . In this case coups take place regardless of the value of ap. If
the politicians chooses ap = 0 her payoff is
 (E +D)  D + ;
and if she chooses ap = 1 her payoff is
 (E +D) D + :
where given assumption (11) she clearly always prefers the latter.
To summarize, Parts A and B show that when  = 1 the politician sets ap = 1. If  < 
coups are avoided and her payoff is
 (E +D) D + 
1  
while if    coups take place and her payoff is
 (E +D) D + :
Part C: We now check when it is optimal for the politician to choose  = 1. Suppose the
politician sets  = 0. In this case coups never take place, and the politician receives a payoff of
 D   (1  ) apD + 
1  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in which case she clearly sets ap = 0 and receives
 D + 
1   :
When  <  the politician will choose  = 1, ap = 1 and no coups over  = 0, ap = 0 and
no coups when
 (E +D) D + 
1   >
 D + 
1  
which always holds because of Assumption (11).
When    the politician will choose  = 1, ap = 1 and coups over  = 0, ap = 0 and no
coups when
 (E +D) D +  >  D + 
1  
which holds whenever
 <
1  

[ (E +D) D] + D

 ;
This establishes the result.
Proposition 6
Proof. The expressions  and  are both increasing in , so a greater  enlarges the parameter
space for which the politician chooses b = 1 and bap = 1.
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Table 1: Coups, Wars and Heads of State (1965-1999) 
 
 
 
Number of 
Country-Years 
  
Coups  
Coups 203 
No Coups 4,237 
  
Wars  
Wars 837 
No Wars 3,603 
 
 
 
Head of State  
Military Officer 257 
Other 4,183 
  
4,440 
The values refer to the number of country-years in 
which there was at least one coup or one war. The 
identity of the head of state is from the Banks 
(2001) dataset variable S21F3, where a military 
head of state is coded as a ‘3’. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Frequency of Coups and Wars (1965-1999) 
 
 
 
Median Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Max Min Observations 
 
Frequencies 
      
 
Cross-Country 
      
Coups 0 0.031 0.052 0.25 0 150 
Wars 0.03 0.19 0.273 1 0 150 
 
Panel 
(5-year periods) 
      
Coups 0 0.035 0.113 1 0 881 
Wars 0 0.19 0.344 1 0 881 
       
The frequency of coups is measured as the fraction of years in which the country experience at least a coup. The frequency of 
war is measured as the fraction of years in which the country was involved in at least one armed conflict (excluding coups). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3: Wars and Coups, Cross-Country 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Coups Coups Coups Coups Coups Coups 
 Specification 12 Specification 13 
       
Wars 0.202*** 
(0.055) 
0.163*** 
(0.056) 
0.185** 
(0.073) 
   
Wars 2  -0.214*** 
(0.059) 
-0.176*** 
(0.062) 
-0.193** 
(0.078) 
   
Wars (> =0.5)    0.103** 
(0.048) 
0.079 
(0.050) 
0.100* 
(0.059) 
Wars (<0.5)    -0.079 
(0.049) 
-0.063 
(0.050) 
-0.080 
(0.057) 
Income   -0.010*** 
(0.003) 
  -0.011*** 
(0.003) 
Population   0.003 
(0.004) 
  0.006 
(0.004) 
WB Income group NO YES NO NO YES NO 
       
Observations 150 148 115 150 148 115 
R-squared .1182 .1750 .1997 .064 .14 .14 
*significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and reported in parenthesis. Coups 
and wars are historical frequencies in the period 1965-1999 (or from the year following independence – 1999). Income is the log of real GDP (in millions) 
in 1964, or in the year of independence. Population is the log of population (in millions) in 1964, or in the year of independence. WB Income groups are 
as assigned by the World Bank in the WDI (2007). 
 
 Table 4: Wars and Coups, Panel 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Coups Coups Coups Coups Coups Coups 
 Specification 14 Specification 15 
       
Wars 0.190*** 
(0.049) 
0.207** 
(0.094) 
0.189* 
(0.108) 
   
Wars 2  -0.155*** 
(0.051) 
-0.134 
(0.102) 
-0.094 
(0.114) 
   
Wars (>= 0.5)    0.210*** 
(0.038) 
0.254*** 
(0.083) 
0.262*** 
(0.100) 
Wars (<0.5)    -0.171*** 
(0.038) 
-0.179** 
(0.087) 
-0.167 
(0.101) 
Income   -0.011 
(0.019) 
  -0.003 
(0.020) 
Population   -0.031 
(0.036) 
  -0.033 
(0.035) 
Country and Year 
Fixed Effects 
NO YES YES NO YES YES 
       
Observations 881 881 723 881 881 723 
R-squared .030 .283 .281 .042 .296 .294 
*significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are clustered by country and reported in parenthesis. Coups and 
wars are historical frequencies calculated for the following 5 year periods: 1965-1969, 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-
1999. Income is the log of real GDP (in millions) in the year before the start of the period. Population is the log of population (in millions) before the start 
of the period. 
 
